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  In  this  paper  we  show  that  a  homogeneous-product  market  with  multiple 
Bertrand  equilibria  becomes  a  market  with  a  single  Bertrand  equilibrium  when  we 
introduce a small degree of product differentiation. When differentiation tends to zero, 
that  Bertrand  equilibrium  converges  to  the  unique  price-taking  equilibrium  of  the 
homogeneous-product market, which is in turn one of the multiple Bertrand equilibria 
for that market. 
 
Resumen en castellano 
  En  este  trabajo  se  muestra  que  un  mercado  de  un  producto  homogéneo  que 
presenta múltiples equilibrios de Bertrand se convierte en un mercado con un único 
equilibrio de Bertrand cuando se le introduce un pequeño grado de diferenciación de 
productos.  Cuando  dicha  diferenciación  tiende  a  cero,  el  equilibrio  de  Bertrand 
converge al único equilibrio competitivo del mercado del producto homogéneo, que es a 
su vez uno de los múltiples equilibrios de Bertrand de este último mercado. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the very beginning of the history of the concept of Bertrand equilibrium 
(Bertrand, 1883), there exists the idea that such equilibrium exhibits some equivalence 
or convergence with the concept of perfectly competitive or price-taking equilibrium. 
However,  Dastidar  (1995)  has  shown  that,  in  the  context  of  oligopolies  with 
homogeneous  products  and  convex  cost  functions,  Bertrand  equilibria  are  typically 
multiple while price-taking equilibria are unique, and Vives (1999) has shown that, in 
those markets, the price-taking equilibrium allocation coincides with one of the possible 
Bertrand equilibrium ones
1. These results are in sharp contrast with the ones that can be 
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1  In  previous  work  (Coloma  and  Saporiti,  2006)  we  have  shown  that  some  of  those  results  can  be 
extended to homogeneous-product markets with non-convex cost functions, which may have multiple 
Bertrand equilibria even in cases where no price-taking equilibria exist.   2 
obtained for differentiated-product markets, in which Bertrand equilibria are typically 
unique (see, for example, Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991). 
The aim of this paper is to develop a homogeneous-product model that follows 
Dastidar’s  idea,  and  to  show  that,  if  we  allow  for  a  small  degree  of  product 
differentiation, it becomes a case where there is a single Bertrand equilibrium. When 
differentiation tends to zero, that Bertrand equilibrium converges to the unique price-
taking equilibrium of the homogeneous-product market. The way to introduce product 
differentiation is to allow for a representative consumer who possesses a generalized 
CES utility function, for which the substitution among the different varieties of the same 
product can be measured through a single parameter. In order to keep the model more 
tractable,  we  will  concentrate  on  a  case  with  only  two  varieties,  each  of  which  is 
supplied by a different firm. The corresponding Bertrand equilibria, therefore, are those 
of a duopoly in which suppliers are symmetrical. 
  The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we study the Bertrand equilibria 
of homogeneous-product markets, and find conditions for multiple Bertrand equilibria 
to exist. In section 3, we study the unique Bertrand equilibrium of the corresponding 
differentiated-product  markets,  and  its  convergence  to  the  price-taking  equilibrium 
outcome when differentiation tends to zero. Finally, in section 4, we analyze the main 
conclusions of the paper. 
 
2. Homogeneous-product markets 
  Let  us  imagine  a  market  with  two  firms,  each  of  which  with  a  continuous, 
differentiable, increasing and strictly convex total cost function C(Qi), where Qi is the 
quantity supplied by the ith firm. Let us also assume that C(0) = 0. 
The product traded in this market is homogeneous, with total demand equal to Q 
=  D(P),  where  Q  is  total  quantity,  P  is  the  price  paid  by  consumers,  and  D  is  a 
continuous, differentiable and decreasing function of P, with limP®¥D(P) = 0. 
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where Pi is the ith firm’s price and Pj is the price chosen by its competitor
2. 
  The ith firm’s profits, therefore, can be defined as: 
Pi(Pi, Pj) = Pi×Di(Pi, Pj) – C(Di(Pi, Pj))    ; 
or, alternatively, as a function of its output, leaving implicit the price vector and the 
corresponding individual demand. This implies that: 
Pi(Qi) = Pi×Qi – C(Qi) . 
 
Definition 1 (Price-taking equilibrium): Given a non-negative price Pc, a price-taking 
equilibrium (PTE) is a pair (Q1, Q2) ÎÂ
2
+ such that, for each i = 1, 2: 
{ } ) Q ( C Q P max arg Q i i c Q i i - × =
+ Â Î
              (C1) ; 
 Pc×Qi – C(Qi) ³ 0 
                (C2) ; 
 Q1 + Q2 = D(Pc)                  (C3) . 
  Note  that  C3,  together  with  the  sharing  rule  implicit  in  the  definition  of 
individual demands, implies that, if (Q1, Q2) is a PTE for a given Pc ³ 0, then Q1 = Q2 = 
D(Pc)/2. We can therefore refer to (Pc, Qi) as a PTE, understanding that this means that 
(Q1, Q2) = (Qi, Qi) satisfies conditions C1-C3 above under the price Pc.  
  The assumptions about D and C guarantee that it is always possible to find a 
unique pair of positive values of Pc and Qi that satisfies C1 and C3. C2, moreover, will 
also be satisfied by the pair (Pc, Qi) implied by C1 and C3. Conceptually, this occurs 
because C1 and C3 determine an allocation for which price is equal to the marginal cost 
of  each  of  the  firms  that  operate  in  the  market,  and  the  strict  convexity  of  C(Qi) 
guarantees that its average cost is always smaller than its marginal cost for positive 
values of Qi. Pc, therefore, will always be larger than the corresponding average cost, 
and hence profits will be non-negative and C2 will be fulfilled in equilibrium. 
 
Definition 2 (Bertrand equilibrium): A pure-strategy Bertrand equilibrium (PBE) is a 
pair (P1, P2) ÎÂ
2
+ such that, for each i ¹ j: 
)     P ˆ   all (for       ) P , P ˆ ( ) P , P ( j i j i i + Â Î P ³ P             (E1) ; 
0 ) P , P ( j i i ³ P                    (E2) ; 
) P , P ˆ ( D ) P , P ( Q j i j i i =                  (E3) ; 
                                                
2 Note that this definition of the individual demand of the ith firm implies assuming an “equal sharing   4 
where Qi(Pi, Pj) is the output supply of the ith firm at prices (Pi, Pj). 
  It is relatively easy to show that, if a PBE exists, then P1 = P2 = Pb. As the 
market-sharing rule assumed implies that D1(Pb, Pb) = D2(Pb, Pb) = D(Pb)/2, then E2 
can be re-written as: 
0
2
) P ( D
C
2








 - ×                 (E4) ; 
while E1 simply requires that: 
( ) ) P   P ˆ   all (for       ) P ˆ ( D C ) P ˆ ( D P ˆ
2
) P ( D
C
2
) P ( D
P b
b b





 - ×       (E5) . 
  When E4 is satisfied as a strict equality, we obtain the minimum price Pmin that 
can be supported as a PBE. Similarly, when E5 is satisfied as a strict equality we get the 
maximum price Pmax that can be supported as a PBE. For the set of PBE to be non-
empty, it is necessary that Pmax ³ Pmin. In fact, if Pmax > Pmin, there exists a continuum of 
Bertrand equilibria (P1, P2), with the property that in each of them it holds that P1 = P2 
Î [Pmin, Pmax]
 3. One of the elements of this set is the PTE price (Pc), as it is shown in 
proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1: If (Pc, Qi) is a PTE, then (Pc, Pc) is a PBE, and Pc Î [Pmin, Pmax]. 
Proof: Assume, by contradiction, that (Pc, Pc) is not a PBE. Note first that, since (Pc, 
Qi) is a PTE, then C2 and C3 imply that E3 and E4 are satisfied at (Pc, Pc). Hence, there 
must exist a price Pi such that Pi(Pi, Pc) > Pi(Pc, Pc) ³ 0. That means that Pi(Pi, Pc) = 
Pi×Di(Pi, Pc) – C(Di(Pi, Pc)) > 0 and, therefore, Pi < Pc. 
In equilibrium, then, Qi = Di(Pi, Pc) = D(Pi). Totally differentiating Pi×Qi – C(Qi) > 0 
with respect to Qi, we have Pi > ¶C(Qi)/¶Qi. But we know, by C1, that Pc = ¶C(Qc)/¶Qi. 
Moreover, since Pi < Pc, D’ < 0 and C’’ > 0, it follows that ¶C(Qc)/¶Qi < ¶C(Qi)/¶Qi. 
Therefore, Pi > ¶C(Qi)/¶Qi implies that Pi > Pc, and this is a contradiction. Hence, (Pc, 
Pc) is a PBE, i.e., Pc Î [Pmin, Pmax], qed
4. 
 
The existence of the price-taking equilibrium is therefore a sufficient condition 
for the Bertrand equilibria to exist, and the reverse is also true. This is because, by 
definition, Pc > Pmin and Pmax > Pc, so if the interval [Pmin, Pmax] is not empty, then Pc 
                                                                                                                                          
rule”. For other alternative rules applicable to situations of price competition, see Hoernig (2007).  
3 Note that all these are “Bertand equilibria” and not “Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria”, since E3 requires 
that firms meet all the demand at the equilibrium prices. Their only strategic choice, therefore, is the price 
that they charge and not the quantity that they sell. For an explanation of the difference between Bertrand 
and Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria, see Vives (1999), chapter 5.   5 
must belong to  that interval and  the  PTE must therefore  exist. The PTE allocation, 
therefore, is one of the multiple PBE allocations that this type of markets exhibit. 
  Let us now consider a numerical example of a market with two firms, each of 
which with a total cost function Ci = Qi
2. Let us assume that the total demand function 
of  this  market  is  Q  =  2/P.  The  corresponding  PTE  occurs  when  Pc  =  2 Qi  (profit 
maximization condition for the ith firm) and the market-clearing price is equal to Pc = 
2/(2 Qi). Equating both conditions we end up with an equilibrium in which Qi = 0.7071 
and Pc = 1.4142.  This allocation generates a positive profit for  the two duopolists, 
which is equal to Πi = 0.5. To check that Pc is a price that belongs to the interval of PBE 
symmetric equilibria, we can check that Pmax > Pc > Pmin. Indeed, in this example P = 
Pmin is the number for which it simultaneosuly holds that P = Qi and P = 2/(2 Qi), and 
this occurs when Qi = 1 and Pmin = 1. Conversely, P = Pmax is the number for which it 
simultaneosuly holds that P  Qi – Qi
2 = P  (2 Qi) – (2 Qi)
2 and P = 2/(2 Qi), and this 
occurs when Qi = 0.5774 and Pmax = 1.7321. As we see, 1.7321 > 1.4142 > 1, and this 
confirms that the interval [Pmax, Pmin] is not empty and that Pc belongs to that interval. 
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The  numerical example  referred  to  in  the  previous  paragraphs  is  graphically 
represented on figure 1. In it we see the total demand curve that we have postulated (Dt) 
and the portion of that curve that corresponds to each of the two firms that operate in the 
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market (Dt/2). We have also depicted the individual marginal cost curve (MCi), and the 
individual  average  cost  curve  (ACi).  Given  those  elements,  the  lower  limit  of  the 
interval of PBE prices (Pmin) is determined by the point where ACi crosses Dt/2, while 
the PTE price (Pc) is that for which MCi crosses Dt/2. Finally, the upper limit of the 
interval of PBE prices (Pmax) is that for which the distance between MCi and Dt/2 
exactly coincides with the distance between Dt and MCi. 
 
3. Differentiated-product markets 
  Let us now assume that each of the duopolists that operate in the market supplies 
a differentiated product. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that differentiation is 
symmetric, and each firm faces the following demand function: 
2
) R ( D
Q
i
i =                 (for i = 1, 2)  . 
In this context, D is the same demand function used in section 2, and Ri is the 












=              (for i = 1, 2 and j ¹ i)  ; 
where q Î [0, 1] is a parameter that measures product differentiation. When q  tends to 
one, product differentiation is maximal, and Qi = D(Pi)/2 for any value of Pi and Pj. 
When  q  tends  to  zero,  conversely,  the  product  approaches  homogeneity  (and  the 
individual demand function converges to the one that we have seen in section 2). 
  This  demand  function  can  be  derived  from  the  optimization  problem  of  a 
representative  consumer.  The  preferences  of  this  representative  consumer  are  a 
generalization  of  the  so-called  “constant-elasticity-of-substitution  utility  function” 
(CES), whose form is U = U(Q1
1-q+Q2
1-q, Q3, ..., Qn). The two products under analysis 
are products 1 and 2, respectively, and the implicit assumption is that income and prices 
of the other products are held constant. 
  In a market like this, a PBE must fulfill the same conditions stated by definition 
2, namely: 
)     P ˆ   all (for       ) P , P ˆ ( ) P , P ( j i j i i + Â Î P ³ P             (E1) ; 
0 ) P , P ( j i i ³ P                    (E2) ;   7 
) P , P ˆ ( D ) P , P ( Q j i j i i =                  (E3) . 
  If a PBE exists for this market, it must be unique. It will imply an allocation 
formed  by  a  symmetric  pair  of  prices  and  quantities  “Pi,  Qi”  that  simultaneously 
satisfies  conditions  E1  and  E3,  and  it  will  exist  as  long  as  that  pair  also  satisfies 
condition  E2.  When  q  tends  to  zero,  this  allocation  converges  to  the  PTE  of  the 
homogeneous-product case, and it therefore exists. It also exists for any q > 0. Bertrand 
equilibrium  prices  are  increasing  in  q,  and  the  profits  that  the  firms  obtain  in 
equilibrium are also increasing in q. The PTE allocation, conversely, is the same for any 
q Î [0, 1], and therefore its corresponding equilibrium price is always smaller than the 
Bertrand equilibrium price. All these results are more formally stated in propositions 2 
and 3. 
 
Proposition 2: If (Pc, Qi) is a PTE when θ = 0, then it is also a PTE for all θ > 0. 
Proof: If (Pc, Qi) is a PTE when θ = 0, then Pc = ¶Ci/¶Qi and Qi = D(Pc)/2. As this 
implies a symmetric allocation, then Pc = Pi = Ri, and therefore Ri =¶Ci/¶Qi and Qi = 
D(Ri)/2. As these equalities hold for any θ > 0, then (Pc, Qi) is also a PTE for any θ > 0, 
qed.  
 
Proposition 3: When θ > 0, there exists a unique PBE allocation, whose equilibrium 
price converges to the PTE price (Pi ® Pc) when q ® 0. 
Proof: Applying E1 and E3 in a context of a continuous, decreasing and differentiable 
demand function and continuous, increasing, differentiable and convex cost functions, 
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where  η  is  the  absolute  value  of  the  own-price  elasticity  of  D(Pi).  If  θ  >  0,  then 
(2 θ)/[η (1+θ)] > 0, and therefore Pi > ¶C(Qi)/¶Qi > ¶C(Qc)/¶Qi = Pc. This guarantees 
that  E2  is  satisfied.  When  q  ®  0,  then  (2 θ)/[η (1+θ)]  ®  0,  and  therefore  Pi  ® 
¶C(Qi)/¶Qi ® ¶C(Qc)/¶Qi = Pc, qed. 
 
  To illustrate these results, consider the numerical example developed in section 
2. If we introduce product differentiation in this numerical example, then the demand 











Q     ; 
and the symmetric PTE occurs when Qi = 0.7071 and Pc = 1.4142. This is independent 
of  the  value  of  q,  because,  when  Pi  =  Pj,  then  Qi  =  2/Pi.  The  corresponding  PBE   8 
allocation, conversely, occurs when Pi = [2×(1+q)/(1-q)]
0,5 and Qi = [(1-q)/(2+2×q)]
0,5, 
and  does  therefore  depend  on  the  value  of  q.  The  PBE  price  is  increasing  in  the 
parameter q, and converges to infinity when q tends to one and to Pi = Pc = 1.4142 
when  it  tends  to  zero.  The  PBE  quantity  is  decreasing  in  the  parameter  q,  and  it 
converges to zero when q  tends to one and to Qi = 0.7071 when q  tends to zero. 
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  Figure 2 is a graphical representation of our numerical example. In it we can see 
that, while the PTE price (Pc) is always the same for any value of θ between 0 and 1, 
the PBE price (P(PBE)) is increasing in θ, and it equals the PTE price when θ converges 
to zero. 
  The  reader  may  wonder  why  the  range  of  multiple  symmetric  PBE  of  the 
homogeneous-product  case,  given  by  [Pmin,  Pmax],  disappears  when  product 
differentiation arises. The answer has to do with the fact that, when θ = 0, individual 
demands are not continuous in the symmetric equilibria, and they “jump” from Qi to 
2×Qi when Pi decreases slightly. If θ > 0, conversely, individual demands are continuous 
when both firms charge the same price, and this continuity is precisely the characteristic 
that determines that the PBE allocation is unique. 
   9 
4. Concluding remarks 
  This paper has tried to conciliate two opposing results of the literature associated 
to the concept of Bertrand equilibrium. One of them is the one that appears in Dastidar 
(1995), who shows  that pure-strategy  Bertrand equilibria are typically  multiple  in a 
homogeneous-product  case
5.  The  other  one  is  the  one  that  appears  in  Caplin  and 
Nalebuff (1991) and other similar articles,  which show  that Bertrand equilibrium is 
typically unique in a differentiated-product case. 
  By  building  a  duopoly  model  in  which  product  differentiation  is  measured 
through a single parameter, we find that uniqueness is preserved, and that the Bertrand 
equilibrium of a differentiated-product market converges to the price-taking equilibrium 
when differentiation tends to zero. Consequently, the PTE allocation is the only PBE 
allocation of the homogeneous-product case that survives a “perturbation” consisting in 
the introduction of a small degree of product differentiation. 
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